AT the beginning of the eighteenth century the time-honoured identification of mental disease with derangements of the humoral factors still prevailed. Another closely related, but less well known tradition localized diseases of the mind to specific mental faculties. Diseases of the imagination were thus distinct from diseases of thejudgment, memory, or will. These ideas were based upon an implicit vitalism; i.e. the faculties were envisioned as free and active aspects of the mind in some way independent of the laws governing the material and biological world.
Locke implied in his description of the thought patterns as 'inseparable', that the association process was an automatic affair, taking place beyond the control of the active mind. Reason, though seemingly in control of thought arrangements, was helpless once the diseased pattern was established in the mind. The diseased association had the power of disrupting man's morality and behaviour, until eventually all aspects of his nature became distorted. The detrimental effects of a distorted complex of thoughts are described as follows:
This wrong Connexion in our Minds of Ideas in themselves, loose and independent one of another has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and Notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after ... When this Combination is settled and Whilst it lasts, it is not in the power of Reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. ' David Hartley was primarily interested in defining his own concepts of vibration and association, but practical application of his psychology had an important effect on medical thought. Melancholy for instance could arise from hyper-irritability of the medullary substance, predisposing to painful vibrations.' Intoxication, likewise, favoured abnormal movements in the brain. Madness was a nervous disorder resulting from the unnatural associations produced by excessive, prolonged vibrations.
Suppose a person, whose nervous system is disordered, to turn his Thoughts accidentally to some barely possible Good The initial formulations of association psychology were not readily accepted. Early eighteenth-century physicians could not easily accept the whole complex scheme of this new school of thought, for they could understand neither Locke's abstract psychology, nor Hartley's bizarre vibrational theory. Gradually, however, various elements of the new psychology found their way into medical writing; for instance in Charles Perry's discussion of madness we find little understanding of associationism,6 his theory being based upon the doctrine of animal spirits and the ancient humoral theory. Perry was none the less impressed by the claim that madness resulted from abnormal vibrations, and even went so far as to describe Hartley 'as the great champion of the world'.7 Cheyne, despite his preoccupation with faculty psychology and metaphysics, wrote extensively on the vibrating particles responsible for the nervous impulse,8 which he attempted to identify with the animal spirits.9 William Battie had no greater understanding of the basic tenets of association psychology, yet his view of madness as a disease of sensation showed the influence of Locke.10 In general, however, only fragments of the new psychology are encountered in the writings of the first half of the century. Hartley's Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectation was first published in 1730, but it was not until the second half of the century that his ideas were taken seriously by the medical profession. This must partly be attributed to William Cullen's adoption of Hartley's basic assumptions1' save only the vibrational theory. In a similar fashion Cullen's views on psychiatric illness were completely in accord with association psychology.'2 He believed that insanity was primarily a disease of the faculty of judgment. Even here faulty associations were taking place and were responsible for the disrupted judgment. Cullen described the importance of the normal and abnormal processes of association for the judging faculty as follows:
Another circumstance, commonly attending delirium, is a very unusual association of ideas. As, with respect to most of the events of common life, the ideas laid up in the memory are, in most men associated in the same manner; so a very unusual association, in any individual must prevent his forming the ordinary judgnent of those relations which are the most common foundation of association in the memory, and, therefore, the usual and commonlyhurried association of ideas, usually is and may be considered part of delirium. In particular, it may be considered as a certain mark of the general morbid affection of the intellectual organs.13
The view that an abnormal chain of ideas was indicative of brain disease came to be the most important and fundamental expression of associationism in medicine. Although Cullen The power of association of ideas in the mind is here very remarkable. A child was frightened into an epileptic paroxysm by fear, induced by a great dog leaping upon him. The fit returned upon his seeing some time afterwards a larger dog than the one which had caused his terror, and even by hearing his barking at a distance."' Francis Willis, too, was particularly impressed by Cullen's work, and regarded mental disorder as nervous disease that resulted, inter alia, in a decreased ability to properly connect ideas.'2 In a few rare instances the doctrine crept into the neurological writings. Erasmus Darwin, for example, devoted a large part of his primitive neuropathology to those diseases in which the 'association' of various nervous tissue mechanisms was disrupted." These sundry uses of associationism are important in that they illustrate the extent to which the concept had infiltrated eighteenthcentury medicine. What is most impressive is the specific use ofassociation psychology by those few physicians who were both philosophers and psychiatrists.
Alexander Crichton was the first physician after Arnold to fulfil both these criteria.
He was, perhaps, more thoroughly familiar with the philosophical writings of his day than any other contemporary physician. The influence of these academic influences on his psychiatric thought can be seen in his nosological classification. Three basic types of mental derangement were postulated. The first was delirium, in which both perception and the higher faculties were deranged. Illusion formed the second category, in which perception was diseased while the higher faculties remained intact.
In the third class of illness, amentia, the faculties were deranged independent of perception.24 Diseases of the associating mechanism fell into this third class, for Crichton regarded the association of mental data as the mechanism by which the various intellectual faculties operated. If the process of association was unusually strong, the imagination and memory would be so lively as to override the power of judgment to rearrange the thought combination.'6 If the associating powers were too weak, the memory and imagination would suffer and a dull intellect would result.26 For these reasons, Crichton felt that memory, judgment and imagination were the faculties most closely dependent upon proper association. It followed that these were the faculties to become diseases when the associating powers became distorted. R. Hoeldtke To justify this view, Haslam had to utilize nearly all the elements of the eighteenth-century psychology we have been discussing. He did this in a unique fashion, and couched his argument in terms of a novel etymological argument. He believed that the language of the faculty psychologists was not the product of free and independent minds, but was derived from perceptible objects in the physical world. 'Sorrow', a term for a mental feeling, was borrowed from 'soreness', a well known state of the body. Conception, derived from 'cum' and 'capio' brought to the mind the physical notion of 'grasping together' or embracing. Perception was derived from 'per' and 'capio' naturally meant to 'grasp through' the organs of sense. Thus these psychological terms were based upon subtle relationships with objects and activities of the real world. Since the mind was not capable of formulating a language independent of the external world, then the mind was not independent. Haslam summarized this argument as follows:
If mind were actually capable of the operations attributed to it, and possessed these powers, it would necessarily have been able to create a language expressive of these powers and operations. But the fact is otherwise. The language which characterizes mind and its operations has been borrowed from external objects."" From these assumptions it followed that the faculties themselves, like the language of mind generally, were dependent upon those physical objects upon which their etymology was based.
It can scarcely be necessary, to fatigue the reader, by reverting to the etymology of those terms which have been considered as siguificant of mind and its operations. Everyone will be able sufficiently to develop imagination, reflection, combination (as applied to ideas, importing the amalgamation of two into one) abstraction ... and a variety of others; and to show that they have arisen from physical objects and the circumstances which surround us, and are independent of any operation which mind has eleborated."3 The above argument, however bizarre at face value, is but a novel formulation of the empirical psychology with which we are already familiar. Haslam's thesis can be reduced to the simple syllogism: Since the mind depended upon language, and language depended upon the external world, it followed that the mind also depended upon the external world.
The etymological argument was only one approach among many. Haslam also had several less abstruse reasons for rejecting the faculties. The one most pertinent here depended upon a straightforward application of association psychology. Haslam compared the innate intellectual abilities of young animals and human infants.
Young beasts, it was argued, developed more quickly than young children, and also possessed greater powers of memory. Thus any superiorities that appeared in human adulthood could hardly be attributed to higher innate powers. It was, rather, the distinctively human capacity to form a language which made possible those associations and perceptions that provided the foundation of intelligence.33 Since the sensing and associating mechanisms were the basis of language, then they were also the basis of thought. ThC The History of Associationism readily acknowledged. This dependence upon Locke is an important feature in Haslam's thought, and can also be seen in the adoption of his predecessor's belief that the perversion of natural association was a characteristic feature of the insane. Haslam even claimed that the 'proper succession' of ideas was the most important single factor upon which the health of the mind depended.3 Haslam went further than Locke and argued that the association process, normal or abnormal, took place passively within the physical substance of the brain. The organic basis of the association process had already been stated by Hartley, Cullen Cox' s allusion to the persistence ofsensation after the removal of the eliciting stimulus is of particular interest. The persistence of mental data in the mind was a fundamental assumption upon which association psychology was based. It is remarkable that Cox should make this traditional and sophisticated analogy in a basically simple and practical treatise which was almost devoid of references to academic psychology.
Other uses of associationism were not so subtle. In Allen's Essay of Classification it is suggested that mental hospitals should have several buildings, each of distinct style and appearance, in order that patients, upon improving, could be moved into different quarters. It was assumed that during the worst phase of an illness the patients developed 'painful associations' with objects in the immediate environment, which could be broken merely by placing the ill person in a new building.37 Allen asserted, in a similar fashion, that patients were not advised to leave the institutions since 'painful and dangerous association', of which the patient might not even be aware, were commonly attached to homes and families.-"
A wealth of such practical applications of and superficial allusions to 'associated ideas' can be found in the psychiatric writings of Haslam's time. The many references to the 'morbid train of thoughts' indicate that the concept of associations was not merely the preoccupation of the philosophers. Strange or incoherent thought patterns were thought to be a fundamental characteristic of the mentally ill.
Association psychology, as a school of thought, ceased to play a significant role in the English writings of the early nineteenth century. Haslam greatly influenced the physicians of his day, although they were more impressed by his organic approach than by the eighteenth-century psychology upon which it was based. They were less interested in mental phenomena than in physiology and pathology of the brain. Spurzheim Reid formulated many of the basic assumptions of the Scottish 'common sense' school of philosophy. He disagreed with the attempts of Hume and his English colleagues to reduce intellectual activity to the physiological processes of sensation and association, for he was opposed to the way in which these mechanistic concepts neglected the soul and its innate activities. To combat a growing scepticism, Reid returned to the faculty psychology which his progressive contemporaries had rejected. It was not the biological faculties of Aristotle and Galen that interested the Scottish philosopher. In quite a different fashion Reid restated the highly metaphysical, scholastic view of the mind." Intellectual activity was based upon innate inductive powers called faculties. The dogmatic and radical nature of Reid's thought can be seen in his reluctance to allow even perception to take place in the material world. The intellect 'sees' or the intellect 'hears' directly; i.e. these processes took place simply because God had given man the perceptive faculties.55 Reid dismissed the English belief that objects yielded impressions transmitted along the nerves and in this way pushed a dualistic interpretation of faculty psychology to its further limit, for even Aquinas had allowed the sensitive faculty to operate through bodily organs. Few of the Scottish philosophers completely accepted Reid's radical view of the faculties, although the general emphasis upon the innate power of the mind to act independently of sensation was the common denominator of Scottish philosophy. It was perhaps Scotland's conservative Presbyterianism that dictated these traditional views. Certain of Reid's followers were nevertheless interested in Hume and Hartley's associations, an interest which complicated matters considerably since associationism and faculty psychology were historically linked to very different schools of thought. A compromise of some sort was necessary and to effect this the Scottish philosophers redefined the tenets of association psychology. Thomas Brown's writings in the early nineteenth century show a greater affinity for Hume than Reid. Brown wrote extensively on the laws of association, and with the sole exception of Hartley, he made this concept more central to his thought than any other philosopher we have discussed. His substitution of the term suggestion for association shows that Brown could never be considered an adherent of the eighteenthcentury school. The former term was considered more desirable since it left room for the participation of the mind.56 The intellect could actively respond to sensations (suggestions) by perceiving relationships with prior sensations. Such a concept was quite different from the eighteenth-century idea that associations took place automatically, i.e. the earlier school maintained that sensations (ideas) were associated simply because they preserved relationships of external objects in time and space. For the eighteenth-century psychologists the mind remained passive and did little U GRWORY, A comparative view on the state of the faculties, p. 8. 
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R. Hoeldtke eclectic treatment of the associating process. The basic argument was very simple. Stewart claimed that during sleep the passive natural associations could take place without the perpetual interference of the active powers of mind. Since the will and the attention were suspended, thoughts could be connected passively after the fashion of the eighteenth-century philosophers. This meant that the dreaming state provided a valuable opportunity for examining the associating process directly.62 Since the active faculties ceased to function, the natural, involuntary associations came to the surface. Stewart summarized his application of association psychology to the phenomena of sleep and dreaming as follows:
... the same laws of association which regulate the train of our thoughts while awake, continue to operate during sleep. I now proceed to consider, how far the circumstances which discriminate dreaming from our waking thoughts, correspond with those which might be expected to result from the suspension of the will. If the influence of the will is suspended during sleep, all our voluntary operations, such as recollection, reasoning, etc. must also be suspended. That this really is the case, the extravagance and inconsistency of our dreams aresuflicient proofs. We frequently confound together times and places the most remote of each other; and, in the course of the same dream, conceive the same person as existing in different parts of the world . . . All this proves clearly, that the subjects which then occupy our thoughts, are such as present themselves to the mind spontaneously and that we have no power of employing our reason.63 Such an interest in sleep and dreaming could never have developed in the English School of the previous century since the mind, given no active power of its own, could hardly be capable of being suspended. Stewart also described other situations in which the faculties of the mind lost control over the associating process. In somnambulism, for example, a large measure of the powers of mind were suspended so that thought was basically spontaneous and uncontrolled. The same interpretation was applied to madness:
In madness, the power of the will over the body remains undiminished, while its influence in regulating the train of thought is in a great measure suspended; either in consequence of a particular idea, which engrosses the attention, to the exclusion of everything else, and which we find it impossible to banish by our efforts; or in consequence of our thoughts succeeding each other with such rapidity, that we are unable to stop the train."
The above quotation appears much like the standard eighteenth-century application of association psychology, but there was a new emphasis in Stewart's thought on the power of the will to control associations. This concept came to play a major role in the psychiatric writings of the time. The History of Associationism as the source of his belief that insanity involved a suspension of the active associating power.66 Stewart's influence thus produced a subtle shift from the eighteenth-century view that the associations themselves were diseased. It was rather the scholastic faculty of volition that was considered the primary site of derangement.
. . . the loss of voluntary power over the succession of ideas is so great in a certain period of dementia that the individual affected is incapable by any effort of mind of carrying on the series of his thoughts to the end of a sentence or proposition.67
To regard insanity as a disease of the will fitted well with Prichard's interest in forensic psychiatry, while his religious beliefs agreed with the theology that was latent in the Scottish concept of mind. This perhaps explains why Prichard broke with his sceptical English predecessors and turned to the Scottish and French schools. John Conolly's concept of insanity was nearly identical to that of Prichard. Insane patients were described in whom the involuntary associations were so strong that ideas could no longer be connected by the will." In his definition of insanity Conolly claimed that the primary site of disease, was the comparing faculty,69 an idea undoubtedly derived from the Scottish school. The faculty of comparison, it will be remembered, was an important focus of discussion for the Scottish psychologists since it was generally considered equivalent to Thomas Brown's process of relative suggestibility. The philosophy of William Hamilton resists an easy explication. As the most erudite member of the Scottish school, Hamilton had studied medicine, law, classics, and philosophy. His learning reinforced the unique and radical nature of his thought. As a result, Hamilton was an autocratic figure among the British philosophers of the The History of Associationism The passive processes of mind implicit in the thought of these early associationists were now spoken of as subconscious mental functions; and the active faculties of mind that Reid had borrowed from Aquinas, were now spoken of in terms of the German concept of Ego.
CONCLUSIONS
Medical psychology preserved the classical faculties of Aristotle, Galen, and Thomas Aquinas unaltered until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Since this psychology was closely related to the scholastic concept of the soul, it was held as dogma until challenged by the empirical philosophy of Locke, Hume and Hartley. In medicine the faculties were only partially rejected. The old psychology was still employed by Willis, Rowley, and Crichton. Arnold and Haslam, on the other hand, forcefully opposed the standard approach, and maintained that the facilities had no place in the new empiricism in medicine.
Associationism came to play a dominant role in the psychiatric thought of the eighteenth century. Sensations, or their resulting ideas, were attracted and combined as though governed by mechanical laws. It was appropriate that the century which considered sensation and association the basis of rational thought, also considered these processes basic to proper nervous and mental functioning. Disorders of the mind were viewed as diseases of the sensing and associating mechanisms. Since both of these processes were controlled by physical, biological factors, it followed that insanity was an organic disease of the brain or the nerves, for the Zeitgeist demanded that the new empirical method be applied to tangible, observable matter. In this way the impact of Newton upon the philosophy and science of the century pervaded the medical world as well.
The early nineteenth-century physicians rejected the psychology of their predecessors in favour of a more practical and scientific approach, although certain Scottish philosophers of the period remained interested in the associationism of the previous century and incorporated it directly into their scholastic view of the faculties. In the simplest terms, they gave the process of mental associations the status of a special faculty of mind. In this way the two traditions we have traced merged in the nineteenth century Scottish school. Such a reconciliation could not easily occur and only became possible by dividing the associating process into its active and passive components. This basic division proved to be more than a mere academic distinction. It was gradually extended until the entire mental apparatus was split. The original terminology of Stewart and Brown was based upon the eighteenth-century concepts of activity and passivity. William Hamilton, and his disciple Thomas Laycock, finally broke into the psychology of the preceding century as they reworked the Scottish philosophy around the German concept of consciousness. In this way the active faculties and the passive associations gradually evolved into the psychiatric concepts of the late nineteenth century.
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